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Abstract. According to the recent amendment of the Hungarian Citizenship Act, Hungarians living outside the 
borders can acquire an additional nationality, and become dual or multiple nationals. The study analyses the 
prohibition or recognition of dual nationality and the relevant practice of neighbouring states as the main purpose 
of the amendment was to enable Hungarians living in territories detached owing to historical events to acquire 
nationality. By assuming international obligations states may limit their discretion in matters of nationality, which 
otherwise fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Human rights drive the regulation of nationality in certain 
cases all the more towards the realm of international law. For that reason, human rights limiting the regulation of 
nationality, such as the right to a nationality, the prohibition of (arbitrary) deprivation of nationality and the 
prohibition of discrimination, also need to be examined. The analysis also extends to the lack of effectiveness of 
nationality of Hungarians concerned as well as the binding nature of the principle of effectiveness. The study 
concludes that the principle of effectiveness may not serve as a basis for other states to declare non-recognition of 
nationality of these individuals. Finally, obligations under bilateral treaties on good neighbourliness, confi dence 
and friendly co-operation concluded by Hungary and several neighbouring states between 1992 and 1996 are taken 
into consideration, as well.
Keywords: dual nationality, statelessness, right to a nationality, prohibition of (arbitrary) deprivation of nationality, 
prohibition of discrimination, domaine réservé, principle of effectiveness
I. Introduction
The recently amended Hungarian Citizenship Act1 provides for a preferential naturalisation 
of Hungarians living outside the borders. According to the amendment, a non-Hungarian 
citizen,2 whose ascendant was a Hungarian citizen, or who demonstrates the plausibility of 
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Széchenyi István University, Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of 
Private and Public International Law, H-9026 Győr, Áldozat u. 12.
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1 Act No. LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship, Art. 4(3).
2 The notions of “citizenship” and “nationality” need to be distinguished on the basis of their 
nature in domestic law and international law. “Citizenship” includes the rights and obligations of a 
person originating from his citizenship. See Moore, J. B.: A Digest of International Law as Embodied 
in Diplomatic Discussions, Treaties and Other International Agreements, International Awards, the 
Decisions of Municipal Courts, and the Writings of Jurists, and Especially in Documents, Published 
and Unpublished, Issued by Presidents and Secretaries of State of the United States, the Opinions of 
the Attorneys-General, and the Decisions of Courts, Federal and State. Vol. III. Washington, 1906. 
273. § 372; Hyde, Ch. Ch.: International Law Chiefl y as Interpreted and Applied by the United States. 
Vol. II. Boston, 1945. 1066–1067; Garay, J. C.: La théorie de la citoyenneté automatique des étrangérs. 
Revue de Droit International, 4 (1926) 1, 135; Isay, E.: De la nationalité. Recueil des Cours, 5 (1924) 
4, 432; Cogordan, G.: Droit des gens. La nationalité au point de vue des rapports internationaux. 
Paris, 1879. 6. Since the existence of citizenship rights and obligations are relevant from the point of 
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his or her descent from Hungary and provides proof of his or her knowledge of the 
Hungarian language may–on his or her request–be naturalized on preferential terms since 1 
January 2011. The changes compared to the previous version of the Act are that the criteria 
of assured livelihood and permanent residence in Hungary as well as the requirement of an 
exam in basic constitutional studies have been waived.
The main purpose of the broad wording of the phrase “whose ascendant was a 
Hungarian citizen, or who demonstrates the plausibility of his or her descent from Hungary” 
is to enable Hungarians and their descendants living in territories detached during the 20th 
century to acquire Hungarian citizenship. In addition, that wording also embraces those, 
who emigrated in the meantime and lost their citizenship.
The fi rst signifi cant group of Hungarians living outside the borders emerged in the 
wake of the Peace Treaty of Trianon of 1920.3 In the course of territorial revisions between 
1938 and 1941, a number of Hungarians received back their Hungarian citizenship.4 
However, at the end of the Second World War, Para. 2 of the Armistice Agreement of 19455 
stipulated that the borders of Hungary must be re-established in line with their status as of 
31 December 1937, and any acts and administrative decisions relating to the territorial 
revisions must be terminated.6 Hence, from among the persons, who acquired Hungarian 
view of domestic law, the term “citizenship” is mainly used as a notion of domestic law. See Koessler, 
M.: “Subject,” “Citizen,” “National,” and “Permanent Allegiance”. The Yale Law Journal, 56 (1946–
1947), 62–63. “Nationality” primarily means the belonging of an individual to a state irrespective of 
citizenship rights and obligations. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874); Romano v. Comma, 
(Egyptian Mixed Court of Appeal), 12 May, 1925. Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 
1925–1926. Case No. 195., 265. For analyses focusing on nationality in international law, it is the 
bond between the individual and the state that has signifi cance; the existence of rights and obligations 
is irrelevant. Consequently, the term “nationality” has to be used in international law.
3 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary. Trianon, 4 June 
1920. Entry into force: 31 July 1921. Arts 61–66.
4 Arbitral award establishing the Czechoslovak-Hungarian boundary, Vienna, 2 November 
1938. Annex, Para. 4. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXVIII. 405. Agreement between 
the Kingdom of Hungary and the Republic of Czechoslovakia on regulation on citizenship according 
to arbitral award in Vienna on 2 November 1938, Budapest, 18 February, 1939.  For more details 
concerning the arbitral award see Kovács, P.: A propos du chemin vers l’arbitrage de Vienne de 1938. 
In: Kovács, P. (ed.): International Law–A Quiet Strength. Le droit international, une force tranquille 
(Miscellanea in memoriam Géza Herczegh). Budapest, 2011. 31–70. Between 15 and 18 March 1939, 
the Hungarian army invaded the territory of Sub-Carpathia. The ensuing questions of nationality were 
regulated in Hungarian domestic law by Section 5 of Act No. VI of 1939. Award relating to the 
Territory ceded by Romania to Hungary, 30 August 1940. Paras 3–4. Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, Vol. XXVIII. 410. Certain elements of the Second Vienna Arbitral Award became part of 
Hungarian domestic law by way of Section 4 of Act No. XXV of 1940. Territories of the South were 
re-annexed after the invasion of the Hungarian army on 11 April 1941. The ensuing questions of 
nationality were regulated in Hungarian domestic law by Section 4 of Act No. XX of 1941. 
5 Agreement concerning an armistice between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on one hand 
and Hungary on the other. Moscow, 20 January 1945. Entry into force: 20 January 1945.
6 Decree No. 526/1945. M. E. executed the Para. 2 of the Armistice Agreement by stating the 
repealing Acts relating to territorial changes after 1937.
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nationality in the course of territorial revisions, only those could retain it, who had 
transferred their permanent residence into the territory of the state as of 31 December 1937.7
Even though the amendment had a primarily symbolic purpose by granting citizenship 
to Hungarians, who or whose ascendants lost their Hungarian citizenship in consequence of 
historic events and hitherto could not retrieve it for lack of residency in Hungary, this 
measure and the reactions of neighbouring states have raised several questions of 
international law.
II. Prohibition or Recognition of Dual Nationality
In accordance with the amendment Hungarians living outside the borders can acquire a 
second nationality in addition to their existing one, and as such become dual nationals 
provided that the state of their former nationality recognises dual or multiple nationality 
(hereinafter: dual nationality). The international community is divided on this matter: a 
number of the states recognise dual nationality, while others refuse it.
1. Prohibition or Recognition of Dual Nationality in International Law
It is generally accepted that matters on nationality–as derived from the sovereignty of 
states–fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states, and form part of domaine réservé.8 
Domaine réservé includes matters in which states enjoy absolute and unrestricted discretion. 
The determination of conditions of the granting and loss of nationality as well as the 
prohibition or recognition of dual nationality also count among these matters. However, the 
discretion of states likewise includes the undertaking of international obligations concerning 
these matters, whereby states may establish limits on their own.9 The undertaking of an 
international obligation “places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the 
[s]tate”,10 but limits cannot be presumed in the lack of will of the state.11 Therefore, the 
sovereignty of states and the limits of international law on matters of nationality “are well 
  7 According to Section 1 of the Decree No. 5.070/1945. M. E., individuals, who acquired 
Hungarian citizenship on the basis of the repealed Acts, but their permanent residency was in the 
territory of Hungary as of 31 December 1937 at the time of entry into force of the Decree, that is on 
21 July 1945, could remain Hungarian citizens. 
  8 See the opposite opinion of Hans Kelsen: “[T]here are no matters which […] are ‘solely’ […] 
[or] ‘essentially’ within the domestic jurisdiction of a state” as long as any matter “acquisition or loss 
of citizenship […] may [also] be the object of an international agreement. The fact that these matters 
are, normally, not regulated by a rule of international law is no reason to assume that they are 
‘essentially’ within the domestic jurisdiction of the states.” Kelsen, H.: The Law of the United Nations. 
A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems. London, 1951. 776.
  9 See the opposite opinion of Hans Kelsen: “Although the individual states remain competent, 
in principle (even under international law) to regulate everything, they retain their competence only 
so far as international law does not regulate a subject matter and thereby withdraws it from free 
regulation by national law. Under the assumption of international law as a supranational legal order, 
the national legal order, then, has no longer an illimitable competence (Kompetenzhoheit).” Kelsen, 
H.: Pure Theory of Law. Clark, 2005. 338.
10 The S.S. Wimbledon (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Poland v. Germany), Permanent 
Court of International Justice, Judgment of 17 August 1923. P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 1, 25.
11 The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment of 7 
September 1927. P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 10, 18.
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compatible”.12 The prohibition or recognition of dual nationality is governed by international 
law to such extent only as the state concerned undertakes international obligations pertaining 
to that matter.
The practice of states concerning dual nationality can be easily ascertained from their 
domestic legal regulations and international obligations. Since Hungarians living outside 
the borders are nationals of neighbouring states, their dual nationality depends on the 
attitude of neighbouring states.
Notwithstanding that the idea of elimination of dual nationality appeared in the so-
called “Bancroft Treaties”13 and in the Convention on certain questions relating to the 
confl ict of nationality laws of 1930,14 the comprehensive regulation of dual nationality 
emerged at the beginning of the 1960s, when the main purpose of the international 
community was to unambiguously prohibit and abolish this phenomenon. The Convention 
on reduction of cases of multiple nationality and military obligations in cases of multiple 
nationality under the aegis of the Council of Europe was concluded in such an environment.15 
According to Art. 1 of that Convention, persons who acquire of their own free will the 
nationality of another state shall lose their former nationality, if both states are parties to the 
Convention. Since neither Hungary nor the neighbouring states–with the exception of 
Austria–are parties to that Convention, the above-mentioned provision is irrelevant.
Concerning another problem arising from dual nationality, that is, the confl ict of 
citizenship rights and obligations of different states, several bilateral agreements have been 
concluded, which adequately ensure the elimination of its negative consequences and 
guarantee the enjoyment of its positive features. Suffi ce it to mention the European 
Convention on Nationality of 199716–to which Hungary and the majority of neighbouring 
states (Austria, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine) are also parties. Given that Art. 17 of the 
Convention deals with the rights and duties related to multiple nationality, and it contains a 
separate chapter on military obligations in cases of multiple nationality,17 the rights and 
obligations of persons towards the states concerned can be easily distinguished.18
12 Triepel, H.: Internationale Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeit. Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1 (1929), 197.
13 The “Bancroft Treaties” were concluded by the United States and other states on naturalisation 
of each other’s citizens in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
14 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Confl ict of Nationality Laws. The Hague, 
12 April 1930. Entry into force: 1 July 1937. Preamble, Art. 12.
15 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in 
Cases of Multiple Nationality. Strasbourg, 6 May 1963. Entry into force: 28 March 1968.
16 European Convention on Nationality. Strasbourg, 6 November 1997. Entry into force: 1 
March 2000.
17 Ibid. Chapter VII.
18 It should be emphasised that Slovakia made the following reservation to Art. 22 on exemption 
from military obligations or alternative civil service: “According to Art. 22, paragraph b, the Slovak 
Republic declares that persons who are nationals of a State Party which does not require obligatory 
military service and who are equally nationals of the Slovak Republic shall be considered as having 
satisfi ed their military obligations when they have their habitual residence in the territory of the 
Slovak Republic.” According to this reservation, Slovakia recognises military service in other states 
depending on the habitual residence in Slovakia–and not depending on the habitual residence in the 
territory of the state concerned as stated in Art. 22(b)–even if the military service is not obligatory.
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2. The Practice of Neighbouring States Concerning Dual Nationality
Romania and Hungary concluded an agreement on the elimination of dual nationality in 
1979,19 in line with the contemporaneous practice of socialist states,20 but it was terminated 
in 1990. Currently Romania can be ranked among those states, which recognise dual 
nationality principally on the basis of the Citizenship Act of 1991.21 Romanians, who keep 
their residency abroad, may acquire citizenship similarly to the Hungarian regulation. The 
main purpose of this rule is to promote the gaining of dual citizenship for Romanians living 
in Moldova. Constitution of Romania refers the regulation of nationality to the Citizenship 
Act, as an organic law,22 which does not consider the acquisition of another nationality as a 
ground for the loss of Romanian nationality.23 Consequently there is no rule in Romania on 
the prohibition of dual nationality, and Hungarians living in Romania can become dual 
nationals after requesting Hungarian nationality.
Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia recognise dual nationality and allow the acquisition of 
another nationality for those living outside the borders similarly to the Hungarian and 
Romanian regulations. The Serbian Citizenship Act of 200424 does not mention the 
elimination of dual nationality; what is more, it offers the acquisition of nationality for 
Serbs living abroad. Since the domestic legal regulation of Serbia is similar to rules of the 
Hungarian Citizenship Act, Serbia obviously does not oppose it. The same holds true for 
the Croatian Citizenship Act of 1991, which likewise allows the acquisition of citizenship 
by Croats even without a domicile in Croatia.25 The Slovenian Citizenship Act of 199126 
and the Act concerning the Settlement of the Status of Citizens of Other SFRY Successor 
States in the Republic of Slovenia of 199927 recognise dual nationality, as well.
Contrary to the above-mentioned states, Ukraine unambiguously prohibits dual 
nationality; consequently Hungarians living in Ukraine lose their Ukrainian nationality 
upon the acquisition of Hungarian nationality. In addition to the Constitution of Ukraine,28 
the Citizenship Act of 200129 also states that the state recognizes only one citizenship per 
person; therefore in case someone gains another citizenship he or she will automatically 
lose his or her Ukrainian citizenship.
19 Agreement between People’s Republic of Hungary and Socialist Republic of Romania on 
Solution and Prevention of Cases of Dual Nationality. Bucharest, 13 July 1979. Entry into force: 10 
February 1980. The Law regarding Romanian Citizenship No. 21 of 1 March 1991.
20 Hungary concluded such agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic 
Republic, Mongolia, Poland and the Soviet Union, between 1958 and 1981. All of them were 
terminated between 1990 and 1994 for different reasons. See Ugróczky, M.: Az állampolgárság 
szabályozása Európában (Regulation of Nationality in Europe). Acta Humana, 10 (1999) 37–38, 63.
21 Law No. 21 of 1991 regarding Romanian Citizenship, Art. 11.
22 Constitution of Romania, Art. 5.
23 Law No. 21 of 1991 regarding Romanian Citizenship, Chapter 5 on losing Romanian 
citizenship.
24 Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Serbia of 2004.
25 Act on Croatian Citizenship of 1991, Arts 11 and 16.
26 Citizenship Act of the Republic of Slovenia of 1991.
27 The settling of the status of citizens of other SFRY Successor States in The Republic of 
Slovenia Act No. 61/99 of 1999. 
28 Constitution of Ukraine, Art. 4.
29 Law on Citizenship of Ukraine of 2001, Art. 2.
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Austria also belongs to the group of states, which refuses dual nationality.30 This 
statement is well illustrated by the fact that from among the neighbouring states Austria is 
the sole party to the Convention on reduction of cases of multiple nationality and military 
obligations in cases of multiple nationality of 1963. According to the Federal Law 
concerning Austrian Nationality of 1985,31 a person, who acquires a foreign nationality 
upon his application, his or her declaration or express consent brings about the loss of 
Austrian nationality, unless he or she was not previously granted the right to retain that 
nationality. Therefore, a person will lose his or her Austrian nationality in consequence of 
acquiring Hungarian nationality, unless he or she was not permitted to retain it.
Slovakia is the only country that responded to the Hungarian amendment by legal 
means. According to the rapidly passed amendment to the Slovak Citizenship Act,32 which 
entered into force on 17 July 2010, persons automatically lose their Slovak citizenship, who 
voluntarily acquire another nationality, with the exception of those, who gain it through 
birth or marriage. In this manner, with a view to avoid the dual nationality of persons 
belonging to the Hungarian minority, Slovakia abandoned her former practice, according to 
which dual nationality was recognised and accepted.
Until 2010, pursuant to the Slovak Citizenship Act,33 Slovak citizenship could only be 
lost upon an explicit personal request for release from the state bond. There existed no 
regulation concerning the loss of citizenship of dual citizens; moreover several conditions 
were required for the elimination of the bond of citizenship. Besides, Slovakia, a member 
state of the Council of Europe, is not a party to the above-mentioned Convention of 1963.
It is worth noting that a bilateral agreement was concluded by Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary in 1960, according to which persons possessing the nationality of both states had 
to make a choice and decide which nationality they wish to retain. Following the dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia in 1992, the two states should have had to demonstrate that they regarded 
the treaty as effective in order to keep it in force. Hungary did not make a statement on this 
matter; what is more, the act that promulgated the treaty was revoked. Slovakia also should 
have made a notifi cation of succession regarding the agreement, but it did not come to pass 
according to the available and confl icting pieces of information. It appears, therefore, that 
Slovakia has changed her former practice and joined the group of states, which refuse dual 
nationality.
The overview of domestic regulations and international obligations of neighbouring 
states reveals that Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia recognise dual nationality, 
whereas Austria, Slovakia and Ukraine prohibit it. Hungarians living in the latter three 
states will lose their nationality, if they voluntarily acquire Hungarian nationality on the 
basis of the amendment of the Hungarian Citizenship Act.
30 It is worth mentioning Decision No. 1217/B/1991. of the Constitutional Court at this point. In 
that case, the applicant presented that the precondition of acquisition of Austrian nationality by way of 
naturalisation was the loss of his former Hungarian nationality.
31 Federal Law concerning Austrian Nationality of 1985, Art. 27(1).
32 Law of Slovak National Council of 19th January 1993 regarding Citizenship of Slovak 
Nationality.
33 Ibid. Art. 9.
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III. Human Rights Obligations of States Concerning Nationality 
Human rights obligations of states limiting the regulation of acquisition and loss of 
nationality in domestic law, such as the respect for the right to a nationality, the prohibition 
of (arbitrary) deprivation of nationality and the prohibition of discrimination, need to be 
examined, as well. The relationship of human rights and the domaine réservé of states can 
be illustrated, inter alia, by General Assembly Resolution 36/103 of 9 September 1981,34 
which–unlike the previous resolutions concerning the inadmissibility of intervention35–
referred to the respect for human rights in the following manner:
“The duty of a State to refrain from the exploitation and the distortion of human rights 
issues as a means of interference in the internal affairs of States […].”36 
Five years later, the International Court of Justice also made a remarkable 
pronouncement in the Nicaragua Case, stressing that “the use of force could not be the 
appropriate method to monitor or ensure [the] respect [for human rights] [...].”37 It may 
readily be inferred from these statements that human rights issues have already left the 
realm of domaine reservé by the 1980s. This conclusion can also be substantiated by an 
important resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law during its session in 
Santiago de Compostela in 1989, which holds that in case of a breach of human rights 
obligations, states cannot evade responsibility by claiming that the matter pertains 
essentially to the reserved domain.38 In other words, states “may no longer invoke the 
inviolability of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in case they are being 
34 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
States. G.A. Res. 36/103, 91st plen. mtg., 9 December 1981, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103.
35 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty. G.A. Res. 2131, 1408th plen. mtg., 21 December 
1965, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2141; Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. G.A. 
Res. 2625, 1883rd plen. mtg., 24 October 1970, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625, Annex; Declaration on the 
Strengthening of International Security. G.A. Res. 2734, 1932nd plen. mtg., 16 December 1970, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2734; Non-interference in the international affairs of States. G.A. Res. 31/91, 98th plen. 
mtg., 14 December 1976, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/91; Non-interference in the international affairs of 
States. G.A. Res. 32/153, 106th plen. mtg., 19 December 1977, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/153; Non-
interference in the international affairs of States. G.A. Res. 33/74, 85th plen. mtg., 15 December 1978, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/74; Non-interference in the international affairs of States. G.A. Res. 34/101, 
103rd plen. mtg., 14 December 1979, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/101; Non-interference in the international 
affairs of States. G.A. Res. 35/159, 94th plen. mtg., 12 December 1980, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/159.
36 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
States. G.A. Res. 36/103, 91st plen. mtg., 9 December 1981, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103, Annex, para 
2.(II)(l). 
37 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States of America), International Court of Justice, Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986. I.C.J. 
Reports 1986. (para 268.) 134.
38 Institut de Droit International, La protection des droits de l’homme et le principe de non-
intervention dans les affaires intérieures des Etats. Session de Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle, 1989. 
Article premier, Art. 2.
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criticized for serious breaches of human rights.”39 For these reasons, the removal of human 
rights issues from the domaine réservé of states thrusts the regulation of nationality in 
certain cases all the more into the realm of international law.
1. Right to a Nationality and Prohibition of Deprivation of Nationality
In recent times, states that refuse dual nationality are occasionally criticised on the basis of 
the prohibition of deprivation of nationality. The case of losing nationality as a consequence 
of the acquisition of Hungarian nationality needs to be analysed from the point of view of 
its conformity with international law.
Austria, Slovakia and Ukraine are equally obliged by international instruments, which 
contain the prohibition of deprivation of nationality. Such instruments include the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,40  and the European Convention on Nationality of 
1997.
The provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that  “[e]
veryone has a right to a nationality”,41 was subsequently taken over by the European 
Convention of Nationality.42 The records of debates that took place during the drafting of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights suggest that the purpose of this provision was 
to ensure protection against statelessness,43 but the obscure phrasing leaves room for 
divergent interpretations. The indefi nite article “a” before the expression “nationality” is 
similar to the numeral “one” in certain languages–for example, “une” in French stands for 
either an indefi nite article or a numeral.44 Consequently, an absurd theory emerged, 
according to which the right to a nationality actually means the right to one nationality,45 
and serves as a means to eliminate dual nationality. Due to the fact that the purpose of 
regulation was undoubtedly to eliminate statelessness, neither a human right of dual 
nationality,46 nor a prohibition of dual nationality can be deduced from the provision under 
consideration.
According to the generally accepted view, the right to a nationality includes the right 
to acquisition and retention of nationality.47 Notwithstanding that scholarly opinions 
39 Sulyok, G.: 2. § [Függetlenség] (2. § [Independence]). In: Jakab, A. (ed.): Az Alkotmány 
kommentárja I. (Commentary of the Constitution I.). Budapest, 2009. 141.
40 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, 183rd plen. mtg., 10 December 
1948. U.N. Doc. A/RES/217A (III). As generally known, the Declaration is a resolution adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly. Even though the resolutions of that organ are not legally 
binding, the Declaration have become binding as customary international law.
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 15(1).
42 European Convention on Nationality, Art. 4(a).
43 Verdoodt, A.: Naissance et signifi cation de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme. 
Louvain, 1964. 156–161.
44 Real content of the paragraph is expressed exactly by the expression “valamely” in Hungarian 
translation.
45 Griffi n, W. L.: The Right to a Single Nationality. Temple Law Quarterly, 40 (1966–1967), 
57–64.
46 Spiro, P. J.: Dual citizenship as human right. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 8 
(2010) 1, 111–130.
47 Chan, J. M. M.: The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right. The Current Trend Towards 
Recognition. Human Rights Law Journal, 12 (1991) 1–2, 3.
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signifi cantly differ concerning the right to change nationality as that particular right is 
related to the disposition of nationality rather than to the elimination of statelessness.
The prohibition of deprivation of nationality cannot be directly deduced from the right 
to a nationality, albeit it is closely linked thereto, and as such, it generally follows the right 
to a nationality in international instruments. The epithets “arbitrary” and “unlawfully” are 
frequently attached as attributes to the prohibition of deprivation, but their interpretation 
gives rise to heated debates. “Arbitrary” as an attribute is used by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the European Convention on Nationality, while “unlawful” appears 
alongside “arbitrary” in the Convention on the Rights of Child of 1989.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality without offering a defi nition of arbitrariness. If the right to a 
nationality is considered as a fundamental human right, any deprivation of nationality that 
results in statelessness can be labelled as “arbitrary” as it would be blatantly incompatible 
with the purposes of the Declaration. It should be added that the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness of 1961 stipulates that states shall not deprive a person of his or 
her nationality, if such deprivation would render him or her stateless. The text of the 
prohibition, however, does not contain any epithets.
Consequently, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality does not cover 
dual or multiple nationals, who will possess at least one nationality after losing a nationality 
through deprivation. This can be illustrated by Art. 7 the European Convention of 
Nationality that, in addition to the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality in Art. 
4(c), permits states to provide for the loss of nationality in their domestic enactments either 
ex lege, or at the initiative of the state, in case a person voluntarily acquires another 
nationality.48 In addition, the Explanatory Report to the European Convention on 
Nationality49 gives indications concerning the prevention of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality. As regards the substantive grounds, “the deprivation must in general be 
foreseeable, proportional and prescribed by law”.50 A deprivation is also arbitrary, if it is 
based on any of the grounds contained in Art. 5(1) on the prohibition of discrimination. The 
Explanatory Report refers to Art. 7 for an exhaustive list of grounds for deprivation, which 
likewise proves that an ex lege loss of nationality in consequence of a voluntary acquisition 
of another nationality cannot be deemed arbitrary.51
The prohibition of denying the right to change nationality in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights entails the prohibition of deprivation of both the renunciation of 
nationality and the acquisition of another nationality. It cannot be construed, however, as a 
prohibition of deprivation of and a right to retain the former nationality, since the expression 
“change” suggests the loss of that nationality.
In sum, the regulation of certain states, according to which persons lose their nationality 
in consequence of the acquisition of another nationality, is in conformity with international 
law. The loss of former nationality in Austria, Slovakia and Ukraine cannot be evaluated as 
an arbitrary deprivation of nationality.
48 European Convention on Nationality, Art. 7(1)(a).
49 Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality. Available at <http://
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/reports/html/166.htm> (26 March 2012).
50 Ibid. para 36.
51 Ibid.
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These regulations should be analysed not only in the context of international law, but 
also in the context of domestic law. In particular, the harmony of the Constitution of 
Slovakia and the amendment of the Citizenship Act calls for thorough examination. 
According to the Constitution “[n]o one shall be deprived of citizenship of the Slovak 
Republic against his or her will”.52 This provision begs the question: Can a request for 
Hungarian nationality be regarded as an intention of the person to give up his or her Slovak 
nationality? It can reasonably be argued that a request by a person for another nationality 
cannot be interpreted as a loss of nationality on his or her own will, even if he or she is 
aware of the consequences of that action, namely the loss of Slovak nationality. The will of 
the person concerned only covers the acquisition of Hungarian nationality, from which the 
intention of losing Slovak nationality cannot be convincingly deduced. According to the 
Constitution, the Slovak nationality can only be lost by way of renunciation, but this case 
does not involve such a renunciation.53 The authoritative clarifi cation of this issue is solely 
within the competence of the Constitutional Court of Slovakia.
2. Prohibition of Discrimination
A possible violation of the prohibition of discrimination may occur in Slovakia from among 
the neighbouring states. It is open to debate whether the Citizenship Act is discriminative as 
it recognises dual nationality in two cases: if the other nationality is acquired by birth or 
marriage. The European Convention on Nationality expressly mentions the recognition of 
dual nationality, if another nationality is automatically acquired by birth or marriage, thus 
the exceptions of the Act seem to be generally accepted at fi rst glance. It is obvious that 
permitting a child to become a dual national at birth is not discriminative, since he or she 
acquires the other nationality automatically, rather than on request. However, in a case of 
marriage the situation is completely different, since the Act only recognises dual citizenship, 
if the Slovak citizen acquires another nationality in connection with a marriage with a 
foreign citizen, by the existence of that marriage. The legislator presumably had an 
automatic acquisition in mind, but the text does not refl ect it unambiguously. Hence it seems 
that in cases of marriage both automatic acquisition and acquisition at request are allowed. 
If either party gains another nationality at request, discrimination between cases on facts 
may occur, because in this case the Slovak nationality can be retained, whereas in every 
other scenario the request of another nationality brings about the loss of Slovak nationality.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not explicitly mention the prohibition 
of discrimination in the context of nationality, but the rule that “everyone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, [...]” 
evidently encompasses the right to a nationality as provided for in Art. 15, as well.54 Thus 
52 Constitution of the Slovak Republic, Art. 5(2).
53 Article 25 of the Citizenship Act of Germany is similar to the regulation of Slovakia, 
according to which “[a] German shall lose his citizenship upon the acquisition of a foreign citizenship 
where such acquisition results from his application [...]”. Although this rule is in compliance with Art. 
16 of the Constitution of Germany, according to which “[n]o one may be deprived of his German 
citizenship. Loss of citizenship arises only pursuant to law, and against the will of the person affected 
only if such person does not thereby become stateless.”
54 Article 2 of the Declaration reads as follows: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
326 MÓNIKA GANCZER
the Declaration prohibits every kind of discrimination regarding to the right to a nationality 
as well as to the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Furthermore, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights of 196655–to which Slovakia is also a party–demands equality 
before the law, the prohibition of discrimination on any grounds, and the granting to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination by the law. 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of 195056 does not contain the right to a nationality, and provides for the 
prohibition of discrimination with regard to rights set forth in the Convention only. Even 
though the Protocol No. 12 to the Convention has since introduced a general prohibition of 
discrimination, Slovakia is not a party thereto.57 The European Court of Human Rights 
would have jurisdiction over related cases only, if Slovakia violated a right set forth in the 
Convention or any of its Protocols to which Slovakia is a party. For that reason, both of the 
above-mentioned European instruments are irrelevant. It does not change the fact, however, 
that Slovakia is obliged to eradicate all forms of discrimination under international law.
IV. Elimination of Statelessness
The notion of statelessness is not defi ned by any of the relevant international instruments. 
In theory, statelessness has two forms: de jure and de facto statelessness. Those persons are 
considered de jure stateless, who do not possess the nationality of any state. De facto 
stateless persons, on the other hand, do possess a nationality in a legal sense, but it is not 
real as the rights and obligations, which originate from that nationality, cannot be exercised 
and fulfi lled for some reason. 
The international community has primarily focused on de jure statelessness, as states 
have erroneously believed that all de facto stateless persons were refugees. At the United 
Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, the 
participating states, in addition to the conclusion of the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness,58 adopted a number of resolutions, as well. One of these resolutions declared 
that “[t]he Conference recommends that persons who are stateless de facto should as far as 
possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an effective nationality”.59 
Naturally, this pronouncement was merely a recommendation for states and had no binding 
force whatsoever.
It comes from the general purpose of the elimination of statelessness that states should 
endeavour to abolish both de jure and de facto statelessness. The purpose of the resolution 
quoted above is to avoid becoming de facto stateless and to achieve a real nationality, which 
can only be ensured by the state of nationality–consequently, this requirement should be 
fulfi lled by Hungary.
55 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966. Entry 
into force: 23 March 1976.
56 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 
4 November 1950. Entry into force: 3 September 1953.
57 Slovakia signed Protocol No. 12 on 4 November 2000, but has not ratifi ed it yet.
58 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, New York, 30 August 1961.
59 United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, 
Resolution I.
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Subsequent to the loss of their previous nationality, Hungarians living outside the 
borders possess a nationality, which is, in principle, identical to that of Hungarians living in 
the territory of Hungary, but in absence of registered residency, employment and tax-paying, 
they are neither able to exercise several citizenship rights, nor receive a share from social 
benefi ts. Even so, they do not become de facto stateless, especially in the light of the right 
to vote as provided by the new Act on election of the members of Parliament.60
V. Effectiveness of the New Hungarian Nationality
The analysis of the lack of effectiveness of the nationality of Hungarians, who live outside 
the borders need to be distinguished from the analysis of de facto stateless status. De facto 
statelessness manifests itself as the inability of the individual to exercise rights and fulfi l 
obligations of citizenship. The examination of effectiveness, however, focuses on factors 
other than citizenship rights and obligations, and concentrates on the genuine link between 
the person and the state.61 According to the judgment passed by the International Court of 
Justice in the Nottebohm Case in 1955, an effective nationality is “based on stronger factual 
ties” between the person concerned and the state. As stated by the judgment, a factor of 
utmost importance is “the habitual residence of the individual”, “but there are other factors 
such as the centre of the [person’s] interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, 
attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.”62 
In addition to the absence of effectiveness, individuals frequently lack citizenship 
rights and obligations, although it does not originate from the absence of effectiveness. 
Such coincidences typically result from the similar features of requirements formulated by 
states concerning the factors indicating the existence of effectiveness and the exercise and 
fulfi lment of rights and duties of citizenship.
Several individuals currently applying for citizenship have previously had Hungarian 
citizenship, and as such, some sort of link exists between them and Hungary, even though 
their permanent residence can be found elsewhere and they habitually live and work in 
another country, usually along with their families. The bond with Hungary is less genuine 
in case of those individuals, who were born and live in the territory of another state, barely 
speak Hungarian63 and acquire citizenship owing to their ascendants. The preferential 
naturalization does not require the passing of an exam in basic constitutional studies, but it 
is worth noting that this exam remains to be a criterion for other kinds of naturalisation in 
Hungary. Compared to the naturalisation of other persons habitually resident in Hungary, 
the legislator indeed set less stringent requirements for a preferential naturalisation. As a 
result, the nationality of Hungarians living outside the borders can hardly be considered 
effective, especially in light of the fact that it is acquired on the basis of the earlier 
60 Act No. CCIII of 2011 on the Election of the Members of Parliament, Art. 12(3).
61 International Court of Justice, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, 
Judgment of 6 April 1955. I.C.J. Reports 1955. 23.
62 Ibid. 22.
63 There is no process for determination of the meaning of providing of proof of knowledge of 
Hungarian language, thus the request form can be fi lled out at home and sometimes the proof of 
knowledge means that the person shall answer in Hungarian some questions regarding his data on the 
request form.
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nationality of ascendants or the demonstration of the plausibility of Hungarian descent, and 
a suffi cient knowledge of the Hungarian language.
In 2004, in a decision concerning a referendum that, had it been successful, would 
have offered citizenship to Hungarians living outside the borders upon presenting “a proof 
of Hungarian nationality”,64 the Constitutional Court failed to recognise an objection, which 
sought to draw attention to the lack of real and genuine link.65 Judge Kukorelli, however, 
correctly argued in his dissenting opinion that “a declaration on national status is inadequate 
to prove the existence the close, real (effective) link between the citizen and the state”.66 In 
the present case, the link is closer, but it is hardly genuine.
Bearing all that in mind, the potential consequences of lack of effectiveness on the side 
of the individual also need to be analysed. First of all, it should be emphasized that the 
norms of international law concerning nationality do not impose an obligation on states to 
grant citizenship to persons only in case a genuine link exists. The same applies, of course, 
to Hungary. Given the diffi culties related to the determination of a genuine link, such a 
norm would allow states to arbitrarily interfere in matters of nationality, which form part of 
domaine réservé. The intentions of members of the international community do not point 
toward the framing of such rule.
The academic debate continues on relationship of the principle of effectiveness and the 
diplomatic protection of individuals possessing one nationality–a topic that was discussed 
by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case. In case the principle exists in 
international law as a customary rule, its content is the following: if diplomatic protection is 
provided on the basis of an ineffective nationality, the other state has a right not to recognise 
that nationality. As a consequence of non-recognition, the nationality does not have an 
effect in the fi eld of international law.
As commonly known, there are two constitutive elements of customary international 
law: an objective criterion, the general practice of states, and a subjective criterion, the 
existence of opinio iuris sive necessitatis.67 When the above-mentioned judgment was 
passed, states applied principles in their nationality regulations, which established a genuine 
link between the individual and the state.68 It does not mean, however that their purpose 
was to create a genuine link in order to bring their regulations in conformity with the 
principle of effectiveness.69 The general practice of states concerning diplomatic protection 
did not put emphasis on the lack of genuine link either.70 In the Nottebohm Case, a reference 
can be found in the rejoinder submitted by Guatemala for the requirement of an effective 
64 The term “nationality” was used in a historical-biological sense and not as a synonym of 
“citizenship”.
65 Constitutional Court Decision No. 40/2004. paras I, 2, e) and III, 3.
66 Ibid. Dissenting opinion of Judge István Kukorelli, para. 1.
67 According to Art. 38(1)(b) of the Statute of International Court of Justice, “international 
custom [is an] evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. “Opinio iuris sive necessitatis” means 
“opinion of law or necessity”, a belief of the state that its action is legally obliged.
68 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, Second Phase, 
Judgment of 6 April 1955. I.C.J. Reports 1955. 22.
69 José Francisco Rezek also mentions that the accordance of domestic regulations is not 
suffi cient to establish the existence of customary international law. Rezek, J. F.: Le droit international 
de la nationalité. Recueil des Cours, 197 (1986) II, 357.
70 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, Second Phase, 
Judgment of 6 April 1955. I.C.J. Reports 1955. Dissenting opinion of Judge M. Guggenheim, 55–56.
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link, but it was not supported by the prevailing state practice.71 According to the dominant 
view in contemporary literature, the rule based on the principle of effectiveness could not 
considered customary international law.72 Judges Klaestad, Guggenheim and Read voiced 
similar considerations in their dissenting opinions.73 
In sum, the Court accepted the arguments of Guatemala, and its decision was infl uenced 
by other principles.74 It based its judgment on considerations that were not refl ected in the 
existing sources of international law, thereby taking a “hazardous course”75 of judicial 
legislation. Following the publication of the judgment the principle appeared to be 
noticeable approved,76 but later it was increasingly criticized. For instance, it was criticised 
that the question of effectiveness was determined on the basis of subjective criteria,77 the 
vagueness of which could easily lead to arbitrary implementation.78 A few years after the 
judgment in the Nottebohm Case, further objections were raised against the principle of 
71 Duplique présentée par le Gouvernement du Guatemala. 2 novembre 1954. Nottebohm Case 
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, Second Phase, 511–512. In her counter-
memorial, Guatemala only referred cases of dual nationality in connection with the principle of 
effectiveness. See Contre-mémoire présenté par le Gouvernement du Guatemala. 20 avril 1954. 
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, Second Phase, 195.
72 See Jones, J. M.: The Nottebohm Case. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 5 
(1956) 2, 243; Parry, C.: Some Considerations upon the Protection of Individuals in International 
Law. Recueil des Cours, 90 (1956) II, 707; Kunz, J. L.: The Nottebohm Judgment (Second Phase). 
American Journal of International Law, 54 (1960) 3, 563; Makarov, A. N.: Das Urteil des 
Internationalen Gerichtshofes im Fall Nottebohm. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht, 16 (1955–1956), 414. See an opposite opinion of Fitzmaurice, G.: The General Principles 
of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law. Recueil des Cours, 92 
(1957) II, 206–207.
73 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, Second Phase, 
Judgment of 6 April 1955. I.C.J. Reports 1955. Dissenting opinion of Judge Klaestad, 31. Dissenting 
opinion of Judge M. Guggenheim, 56–57, 59. Dissenting opinion of Judge Read, 40.
74 Such as the prohibition of mala fi de or fraudulent naturalisation and the prohibition of abuse 
of rights. Parry: op. cit. 707; Jones: op. cit. 244.
75 Hersch Lauterpacht did not analyse the Nottebohm Case in his book, but he emphasised that 
judicial legislation is a hazardous course. Lauterpacht, H.: The Development of International Law by 
the International Court. London, 1958. 19.
76 de Castro, F.: La nationalité, la double nationalité et la supra-nationalité. Recueil des Cours, 
102 (1961) I, 582; Brownlie, I.: The Relations of Nationality in Public International Law. British Year 
Book of International Law, 39 (1963), 314, 349; Panhuys, H. F. van: The Role of Nationality in 
International Law. Leiden, 1959. 158; International Resposibility: Sixth Report by F. V. García 
Amador, Special Rapporteur. Document A/CN.4/134 and Addendum. Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 1961. Vol. II. Documents of the Thirteenth Session Including the Report of the 
Commission to the General Assembly. United Nations, New York, 1962. 49; Harvard Law School, 
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens. Draft no. 12 with 
Explanatory Notes (reporters: Louis B. Sohn–Richard R. Baxter). Cambridge (Mass.), 1961. Art. 
23 (3).
77 Kunz: op. cit. 564; Makarov: op. cit. 418; Parry: op. cit. 711.
78 Perrin, G.: Les conditions de validité de la nationalité en droit international public. In: Recueil 
d’études de droit international en homage à Paul Guggenheim. Genéve, 1968. 878. Nottebohm Case 
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, Second Phase, Judgment of 6 April 1955. 
I.C.J. Reports 1955. Dissenting opinion of Judge Guggenheim, 55–56.
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effectiveness in the Flegenheimer Case. The Italian-United States Conciliation Commission 
argued as follows:
“[W]hen a person is vested with only one nationality, which is attributed to him or her 
either jure sanguinis or jure soli, or by a valid naturalization entailing the positive loss 
of the former nationality, the theory of effective nationality cannot be applied without 
the risk of causing confusion. It lacks a suffi ciently positive basis to be applied to a 
nationality which fi nds support in a state law.”79
In a case analogous to the status of Hungarians living outside the borders, the 
Conciliation Commission denied that the principle of effectiveness may be applicable to 
individuals having only one nationality. One of the main arguments of the Commission was 
that an individual who, in the mobility of modern world, possesses the nationality of a state, 
but lives in another state, where he is domiciled with his family and where his working 
place is located, “would be exposed to non-recognition”.80
Nowadays even the binding nature of the principle of effectiveness is in the centre of 
academic debates. The alteration of the bond of nationality in the modern world obviously 
rules out the inclusion of the principle in an international treaty as well as its establishment 
as a rule of customary international law. In 2000, the International Law Commission held a 
similar view in a report on diplomatic protection:
“The genuine link requirement proposed by Nottebohm seriously undermines the 
traditional doctrine of diplomatic protection if applied strictly, as it would exclude 
literally millions of persons from the benefi t of diplomatic protection. In today’s world 
of economic globalization and migration, there are millions of persons who have 
drifted away from their State of nationality and made their lives in States whose 
nationality they never acquire. Moreover, there are countless others who have acquired 
nationality by birth, descent or operation of law of States with which they have a most 
tenuous connection.”81
Following the survey of international treaties, in can be concluded that the principle of 
effectiveness has not been included in any agreement that could promote its consolidation. 
The analysis of the alleged customary nature of the principle also reveals that states do not 
refer to the principle of effectiveness as a basis of non-recognition of nationality.82 Hence 
neither of the elements of customary international law prevails. There is no relevant general 
79 Flegenheimer Case, Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, Decision No. 182. 20 
September 1958, para. 62. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XIV. 377.
80 Ibid.
81 First Report on Diplomatic Protection, by Mr. John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur. 
Document A/CN.4/506 and Add.1. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II. Part One, 
Documents of Fifty-Second Session. United Nations, New York–Geneva, 2009. 229. Report refers 
also Hailbronner, K.: Diplomatischer Schutz bei mehrfacher Staatangehörigkeit. In: Georg, R.–Stein, 
T. (eds): Der diplomatische Schutz im Völker- und Europarecht: Aktuelle Probleme und 
Entwicklungstendenzen. Baden-Baden, 1996. 36.
82 First Report on Diplomatic Protection, by Mr. John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur. 
Document A/CN.4/506 and Add.1. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II. Part One, 
Documents of Fifty-Second Session. United Nations, New York–Geneva, 2009. 229.
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practice of states nowadays, which is also confi rmed by the majority of scholars.83 In the 
lack of general practice, however, the other element of customary international law, the 
opinio iuris sive necessitatis, cannot even come into existence. For these reasons, the 
principle of effectiveness may not serve as a basis for other states to declare a non-
recognition of nationality of individuals, who possess only one nationality.
The diplomatic protection of dual nationals vis-à-vis to third states is analogous to the 
above-mentioned scenario. Similarly to the situation of individuals, who possess only one 
nationality, the third state may not refer to a lack of effectiveness of nationality of dual 
nationals in order to substantiate its claim of non-recognition of nationality. Therefore, 
diplomatic protection can be provided for dual nationals against third states even on the 
basis of an ineffective nationality.84
The lack of effectiveness may give rise to problems in one case though–if diplomatic 
protection is provided to a dual national by one state of nationality against the other. Suffi ce 
it to recall Art. 7 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, which is considered by the 
International Law Commission as a rule of customary nature.85 That article reads as follows:
“A State of nationality may not exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person 
against a State of which that person is also a national unless the nationality of the 
former State is predominant […].”86
In other words, the claimant state may prove that its nationality is predominant, and as 
such, it can provide diplomatic protection against the other state of nationality. Interestingly 
enough, a non-recognition of predominance may even impinge on an effective nationality, 
because there are exceptional cases, in which both nationalities may be regarded as 
effective. The lack of predominance does not necessarily follow a lack of effectiveness, but 
an ineffective nationality is most likely to serve as a basis for the other state of nationality 
to prove its predominance.
The establishment of this rule may result in exceptional situations, in which another 
state may exercise diplomatic protection against Hungary in respect of Hungarians living 
83 Geck, W. K.: Diplomatic Protection. In: Bernhardt, R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Vol. 1. Aaland Islands to Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944). Amsterdam–
London–New York–Tokyo, 1992. 1050; Randelzhofer, A.: Nationality. In: Bernhardt, R. (ed.): 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Vol. 8. Human Rights and the Individual in International 
Law, International Economic Relations.  New York–London, 1982. 421–422; Sloane, R. D.: Breaking 
the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of Nationality. Harvard 
International Law Journal, 50 (2009) 1, 29–37.
84 Article 6(1) of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection of International Law Commission 
also states that “[a]ny State of which a dual or multiple national is a national may exercise diplomatic 
protection in respect of that national against a State of which that person is not a national.” 
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006. Art. 6. State practice 
appears to be uniform regarding this provision, hence the text of Art. 6(1) can be considered as a 
generally accepted norm.
85 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 
2006. 46. The fi rst part of the sentence is a generally accepted norm of customary international law, 
but the exception appears to be a result of progressive development.
86 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006. Art. 7.
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outside the borders and possessing the nationality of both states. Simply put, the other state 
of nationality may provide diplomatic protection against Hungary to a Hungarian national, 
which is hardly in interest of Hungary.
VI.  Obligations Assumed by Bilateral Agreements on Good Neighbourliness 
and Friendly Co-operation
Bilateral basic treaties were concluded by Hungary and several neighbouring states, namely 
Croatia,87 Romania,88 Slovakia,89 Slovenia90 and Ukraine,91 between 1992 and 1996.92 In 
these treaties states undertook that they develop their relations in the spirit of good 
neighbourliness, confi dence and friendly co-operation, and they establish an appropriate 
framework for co-operation and maintain a dialogue in all fi elds of mutual interest.93 
According to the obligations laid down these basic treaties, Hungary should have 
initiated negotiations prior to the amendment of the Citizenship Act. Matters of preferential 
naturalisation of Hungarians living in the neighbouring states and possessing the nationality 
thereof certainly constitute an area of mutual interest. Slovakia likewise should have 
negotiated with Hungary before its reaction to the Hungarian legislation with a view to base 
inter-state relations on good neighbourliness, confi dence and friendly co-operation.
In order to ensure and maintain friendly relations, the states concerned should co-
operate and consult in every fi eld related to the preferential naturalisation of Hungarians 
living outside the borders. From the point of view of Hungary, an eventual amendment of 
the Citizenship Act or an expansion of citizenship rights by means of facilitating their 
exercise would undoubtedly call for consultations. Neighbouring states, on the other hand, 
which prohibit dual nationality, should also negotiate with Hungary concerning any future 
amendments of the legal consequences related to the loss of their nationality.
87 Agreement on Friendly Relations and Co-operation between the Republic of Croatia and the 
Republic of Hungary. Budapest, 16 December 1992. Entry into force: 21. December 1993.
88 Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Co-operation and 
Good Neighbourhood. Timisoara, 16 September 1996. Entry into force: 27 December 1996.
89 Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the Republic of 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic. Paris, 19 March 1995. Entry into force: 15 May 1996.
90 Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation between the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of 
Slovenia. Budapest, 1 December 1992. Entry into force: 4 March 1994.
91 Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Ukraine on the Foundations of Good 
Neighbourly Relations and Co-operation. Kiev, 6 December 1991. Entry into force: 16 June 1993.
92 In more details see Nagy, K.: Les règles de caractère soft law dans le traités bilatéraux de la 
Hongrie conclus sur la protection des minorités. In: Kovács, P. (ed.): Le droit international au 
tournant de millénaire–l’approche Hongroise. International Law at the Turn of the Millennium–the 
Hungarian Approach. Budapest, 2000. 18–24.
93 Agreement on Friendly Relations and Co-operation between the Republic of Croatia and the 
Republic of Hungary, Arts 1, 8; Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on 
Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighbourhood, Arts 1, 5; Treaty on Good-Neighbourly 
Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic, Arts 
1, 5; Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation between the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of 
Slovenia, Arts 1, 7; Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Ukraine on the Foundations of Good 
Neighbourly Relations and Co-operation, Arts 1, 5.
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Summary
Matters on nationality fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states, and form part of 
domaine réservé, in which states enjoy absolute discretion. Given that the discretion of 
states encompasses the undertaking of international obligations concerning such matters, 
the international legal framework needs to be analysed, as well.
Human rights obligations of states limit the domestic regulation of acquisition and loss 
of nationality in certain cases, particularly in view of the fact that the development of 
international law has led to the removal of human rights issues from the domaine réservé of 
states. Since the purpose of the right to a nationality was undoubtedly to eliminate 
statelessness, the phrase “[e]veryone has a right to a nationality” includes both the right to 
acquisition and retention of nationality. However, it can be construed neither as a human 
right of dual nationality nor as a prohibition of dual nationality. The prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality does not cover dual or multiple nationals, who still possess at 
least one nationality after the losing of a nationality by way of deprivation. Consequently, 
the regulation of certain states, according to which persons lose their nationality in the wake 
of the acquisition of another nationality, is in conformity with international law. In the 
neighbouring states, a possible violation of the prohibition of discrimination may occur in 
Slovakia only. Discrimination between cases on facts may occur as a result of marriage, 
when the Slovak nationality can be retained even if the individual acquires another 
nationality at his or her request.
The purpose of the Hungarian amendment was primarily to provide a symbolic 
Hungarian nationality for ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders. Even so the lack of 
effectiveness may give rise to problems. It is unquestionable that non-resident Hungarians 
acquire an ineffective nationality, and Hungary is not obliged by international law to grant 
an effective nationality. Since the principle of effectiveness does not have customary nature 
in international law, Hungary may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of individuals 
possessing either one or dual nationality, but in the latter case she may do so against third 
states only. Problems may arise in a case of diplomatic protection of dual nationals between 
the respective states of nationality. A possible consequence of the lack of effectiveness of 
nationality of Hungarians living outside the borders may be that Hungary cannot exercise 
diplomatic protection in respect of them. The other state of nationality, however, can 
exercise diplomatic protection in respect of Hungarian nationals against Hungary. The 
nationality of an individual needs to be further analysed if he or she becomes an effective 
national owing to a permanent residency or a working place in Hungary, which ends his or 
her de facto stateless status.
The initiation of meaningful negotiations and the promotion of a constructive co-
operation, as envisaged by the bilateral basic treaties, would be essential for the development 
of inter-state relations and for the protection of individuals, who have or will become 
Hungarian nationals. Without dialogue and conciliation in this fi eld, only the emergence of 
further problems appears certain.
